Given the government agencies’ objectives, we design the optimal auction based on game theoretic reasoning, laboratory experiments, auction simulations, and our practical auction expertise. We not only advise on the auction format, but also on the design details of the auction, including the packaging of the lots. Nowadays, one of the following five auction formats are most often used:
1. Simultaneous multi‐round auction (SMRA);
2. Simultaneous multi‐round auction (SMRA) with flexible switching rules;
3. Simultaneous multi‐round auction (SMRA) with package bidding;
4. Combinatorial clock auction (CCA);
5. Hierarchical package bidding auction (HPBA).
For bidders who are participating in a particular auction we develop an optimal bid strategy based on game theoretic analysis and/or auction simulations. We also provide end-to-end advisory work in the whole process of the auction, including spectrum valuation and competition assessment, in-house mock auction training, advice on “war room” set up, and help with the round-by-round decision making process.
We develop tailor-made auction software (including winner determination problem algorithms) for regulators to implement spectrum auctions and for bidders to analyze, test, and simulate complex spectrum auctions helping them to develop their bid strategy. Auctiometrix developed web-based auction software that can be customized easily to client’s needs. The software incorporates – next to all standard auction formats – recent auction formats, such as SMRAs and CCAs.
For government agencies we validate third party auction software. We check with academic rigor whether the software does what it should do according to the auction rules, in particular whether the used algorithms (such as the WDP algorithm) are correct.
For government agencies we provide end-to-end support (before, during and after the auction). This include industry analyses, guiding consultation processes, drawing up auction material, developing auction software, running (mock) auctions, and reviewing auctions.
For government agencies we conduct extensive evaluations of previous spectrum auctions. The evaluation may include the preparations (i.e. info sessions, mock auctions), the implemented auction design, and the procedures and operations of the auction processes. The review provides specific recommendations for the agency’s policies, processes, and operations for future spectrum auctions, including both good practices that should be continued, and practices that could be improved.
We also do laboratory experiments to test the relative (dis)advantages of auction formats and auction design details. As Auctiometrix is based at the Erasmus University Rotterdam campus, we can make use of the economic laboratory of the Erasmus School of Economics (the so-called ESE-econlab). Students of the Erasmus School of Economics are well trained to participate in our auction experiments.